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Abstract 
One of the key principles of Catholic social thought is known as the principle of subsidiarity. This tenet 
holds that nothing should be done by a larger and more complex organisation which can be done by a 
smaller and simpler organisation. Subsidiarity, understood in this sense, is opposed to forms of 
centralisation, bureaucratisation, and welfare assistance that deprive citizens of their own responsibility 
toward themselves, their families, and their societies. Rather, subsidiarity supports personal 
empowerment and responsibility as much as a proper balance between the public and private spheres, 
with the resulting recognition of the common good that is inherently achieved through the spontaneous 
interactions between free and responsible people. Hence, the subsidiarity principle is a bulwark of 
freedom and it conflicts with all forms of collectivism. It sets the limits for state action. 
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Subsidiarity and a Free Society: The Subsidiary Role of the State in Catholic Social 
Teaching 
 
Augusto Zimmerman 
 
“The Principle of Subsidiarity is opposed to all forms of collectivism. 
It sets the limits for state action”. 
–Catechism of the Catholic Church, par. 1885. 
 
I. Introduction  
 
Subsidiarity is among the most characteristic directives of the Catholic Church’s social 
doctrine. It has been present since the encyclical Rerum Novarum (1891) by Pope Leo 
XII. In general terms, the principle mandates that an obligation be imposed on higher 
governing orders to help or assist lower orders to flourish or accomplish what cannot do 
for themselves.  Subsidiarity enhances the common good by securing the ‘dignity’ of 
self-directing agents that ought to be free from arbitrariness or undue manipulation by 
those who possess higher political or social powers. The principle stipulates that, in the 
use of its legitimate authority, the state ought to be limited by a practical view of the 
common good. Hence, subsidiarity is a principle that recognises the existence of certain 
aspects of human life that are naturally ordained by God, and that the state may not 
legitimately control or intervene.  
 
II. Defining Subsidiarity 
 
The word subsidiarity derives from the word subsidiary, which in turn has its roots in the 
Latin word subsidium. Subsidiarity means ‘help’ or ‘assistance,’ implying that a higher 
governing order has an obligation to help or assist individuals and lower social groups to 
flourish, not to swamp or absorb them.  As such, the subsidiarity principle is among the most 
characteristic directives of the Catholic Church’s social doctrine. Indeed, subsidiarity not 
only has been present since Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Rerum Novarum (1891), but it was 
enunciated by Pope Pius XI in 1931 as a core principle of Catholic social theory. In 
Quadragesimo Anno, Pius IX outlined the principle as follows:  
 
Just as it is gravely wrong to withdraw from the individual and commit to the 
community at large what private enterprise and industry can accomplish, so, too, it is 
an injustice, a grave evil, and a disturbance of right order for a larger and greater 
organisation to arrogate to itself functions which can be performed efficiently by 
smaller and lower bodies. This is a fundamental principle of social philosophy, 
unshaken and unchangeable. Of its very nature the true aim of all social activity 
should be to help individual members of the social body, but never to destroy or 
absorb them.1 
 
                                                          
1 Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno: Reconstructing the Social Order and Perfecting it Conformably to the 
Precepts of the Gospel in Commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Encyclical ‘Rerum Novarum’ 
(Australian Catholic Truth Society, 1931), 25. For a further discussion, see Robert K. Vischer, ‘Subsidiarity as a 
Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution’ Indiana Law Review 34 (2001): 107–108. See also: Peter Widulski, 
“Bakke, Grutter, and the Principle of Subsidiarity” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 32 (2005): 847.  
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The late Catholic political theorist Heinrich Rommen (1897-1967), discussing the relevant 
language of Quadragesimo Anno, explains that ‘the principle of subsidiarity applies . . . to the 
different natural or freely created communities in the social order.  Social life is governed by 
the principles of autonomy, of hierarchy and intervention.’2 With respect to the third 
principle, intervention, Rommen contends that ‘[t]he purpose of this intervention is the 
reconstruction of the order, the rehabilitation of the function, not the abolition of the part or 
the substitution of the state for the lower society.’3 The concept therefore, may be fairly 
described as a principle of competencies which derives its ontological traction from the fact 
that subsidiary function is an important aspect of the common good. 
Subsidiarity is about providing moral and practical functions to the lower orders that 
are essential to a well-functioning community. It is also about placing rightful limits on 
governmental action. That being so, the opposite of subsidiarity is analogous to an organic 
state whereby a central government regulates and controls all aspects of our social life, thus 
hindering personal freedom and prosperity. Subsidiarity is a principle to which Benedict XVI 
returned time and again as he addressed a world that ever threatens to position the lone 
individual against the Leviathan state: ‘When those responsible for the public good attune 
themselves to the natural human desire for self-governance based on subsidiarity, they leave 
space for individual responsibility and initiative, but most importantly, they leave space for 
love (cf. Rom 13:8; Deus Caritas Est, 28), which always remains “the most excellent way” 
(cf. 1 Cor 12:31).’4  In Caritas et Veritate (2009) Pope Benedict emphasised this particular 
view of subsidiarity as, 
     
an expression of inalienable human freedom. Subsidiarity is first and foremost a 
form of assistance to the human person via the autonomy of intermediate bodies. 
Such assistance is offered when individual or groups are unable to accomplish 
something on their own, and it is always designed to achieve their emancipation, 
because it fosters freedom and participation through assumption of responsibility. 
Subsidiarity respects personal dignity by recognizing in the person a subject who 
is always capable of giving something to others. By considering reciprocity as the 
heart of what it is to be a human being, subsidiarity is the most effective antidote 
against any form of all-encompassing welfare state. It is able to take account both 
of the manifold articulation of plans – and therefore of the plurality of subjects – 
as well as the coordination of those plans. Hence the principle of subsidiarity is 
particularly well-suited to managing globalization and directing it towards 
authentic human development.5 
 
III. Subsidiarity in the Writings of Thomas Aquinas 
 
According to John Haldane, two ideas have come to be associated with the concept of natural 
law: ‘First, that of moral objectivity, as grounded in rationally discernible facts of nature, 
facts concerning what is good or evil for rational animals; and, second, that of ethical 
universality. Right or wrong in this account is not a matter of mere opinion or sentiment, nor 
                                                          
2 Heinrich Rommen, The State in Catholic Social Thought (St. Louis/MO: Herder, 1947), 302-3. 
3 Ibid.   
4 Pope Benedict XVI, “Address of His Holiness Benedict XVI to the Participants in the 14th Session of the 
Pontifical Academic of Social Sciences”, Consistory Hall, Saturday, May 3, 2008, at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2008/may/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_spe_20080503_social-sciences_en.html  
5 Pope Benedict XVI, Encyclical letter Caritas in veritate (2009) [57] 
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is it a relative or local matter like custom’.6 On the contrary, ‘social customs and practices 
may be, and often are, judged by reference to universal moral norms such as those of ‘natural 
justice’.’7 These ideas ‘can be found in the developed forms in various philosophical writings 
of the ancient Greeks, particularly those of Aristotle’.8  
St Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) provided a masterful integration of Christian 
theology and Aristotelian philosophy, which ultimately proved to be a catalyst for the birth of 
subsidiarity that, in time, would become a key principle of Catholic’s social thought.9 As 
Haldane points out, ‘[a]nyone who knows anything about Aquinas knows that he effected an 
extraordinary synthesis between Aristotelian philosophy and Christian theology, and that he 
is honoured as one of the greatest thinkers of the Roman Catholic Church’.10 And yet, 
Aquinas was highly influenced by the philosophical writings of Aristotle not only in his 
understanding of natural law theory, but also his idea that human societies naturally progress 
from families, through villages to entire city-states. As noted by law professor Nicholas 
Aroney,  
 
[Aquinas] recognised that what Aristotle said of city-states could be applied not only 
to cities but even more emphatically to political communities on the scale of 
provinces, kingdoms and (perhaps even) empires. … [F]or Aquinas, the civil order 
was not the only ‘perfect community’ in Aristotle’s sense: there was also the church 
in all of its many grades and jurisdictions, alongside the many different religious 
orders and fraternities of medieval Europe, some of them also organised into their 
own graded hierarchies. Reflecting on the complexity of the society surrounding 
him, Aquinas acknowledged the many and various purposes for which various 
associations and forms of human community exist and are formed, giving rise to a 
whole host of familial, geographical, professional, mercantile, scholarly and other 
specialised societies.  All of these groups and groupings, from the smallest to the 
largest, have their place and their proper function, according to Aquinas, and each 
should to be allowed to make its unique and special contribution as a means to 
integral human fulfillment, without undue interference from any others, including 
the state.11 
 
The critical point for the birth of subsidiarity lay in a particular interpretation of Aristotle’s 
political theory, and its adaptation to institutional pluralism – in particular a pluralistic view 
that human society naturally progresses from families, through to villages, and then the 
state.12 It is often forgotten that nation states are, themselves, political associations.  In 
Aristotle’s conception, the polis is not only composed of households and villages, it is 
‘fundamentally comprised of individual citizens (politai), formed into a self-sufficing 
unity’13.  A student of Plato’s academy in Athens, Aristotle believed that humans are social 
                                                          
6 John Haldane, Faithful Reason: Essays Catholic and Philosophical (London/UK: Routledge, 2004), 130.  
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid.  
9 Nicholas Aroney, “Subsidiarity in the Writings of Aristotle and Aquinas”, in Global Perspectives on 
Subsidiarity, eds. Michelle Evans and Augusto Zimmermann (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 15. 
10 John Haldane, Reasonable Faith (London/UK: Routledge, 2010), 19.  
11 Aroney, “Subsidiarity in the Writings of Aristotle and Aquinas”, 9.  
12 Ibid., 9.  
13  Aroney, “Subsidiarity in the Writings of Aristotle and Aquinas”, p 14, quoting Aristotle (Politics, III.1). See 
H. Jaffa, ‘Aristotle’, in History of Political Philosophy, eds. L. Strauss and J. Cropsey (2nd ed., Chicago/IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1972), 94-96, and compare Plato, Republic, II, 369a-c.  On the composition of the 
polis in terms of households and villages as well as individuals, see William L. Newman, Politics of Aristotle, 
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beings (or ‘political animals’, as he put it) by nature, and that the family is an association 
established by nature for the supply of daily needs. However, when people aim at something 
bigger than the supply of their daily needs, they unite themselves in villages and eventually in 
the state.14 Aristotle conceived the state as a natural development of our social impulses. In 
this view, people exist as ‘social animals’. With no social organisation the individual is 
nothing, since progress in human life is only possible through ‘participation in a society of 
like-minded people’.15 Aristotle denied that the polis (i.e., the state) should properly replace 
or supplant the smaller associations of which it is ultimately composed. Because he opposed 
the ‘unification’ of the polis, the Platonic idea that the highest unity of the state is the highest 
good was automatically rejected. Instead, Aristotle noticed that a plurality of societies is 
ultimately desirable, and so the polis should not displace these smaller associations, including 
the household. The state, the village and the household are all species of a broader 
community, even though the state is uniquely the higher order of community and, of which, 
the lesser communities are but ‘parts’.16  
The underlining assumption in such a philosophical thinking is a conception of the 
state as essentially a composition of citizens and smaller associations. These citizens are 
ultimately ruled by a unified form of government, notwithstanding the presence of 
intermediate groups contributing to the overall social-economic life of society.17 To be sure, 
Aristotle’s view was not subsidiary. He notoriously advocated the uniform education of 
children, as a function to be properly exercised by the state, not the household. What is more, 
much of his analysis of the polis treats it as being comprised of citizens who are not entirely 
free but considerably subordinated to the supreme authority of the state.18  
Compared to Aristotle’s, Aquinas’s view of the state is much closer to a subsidiarity 
role. Aquinas is the paradigm Catholic theorist whose theological approach still underpins the 
official doctrine of the Church, especially on the doctrine of natural law. In Aquinas’s Summa 
Theologica one finds a penetrating discussion regarding the concept of law within a broader 
discussion of natural-law philosophy as well as the overall design of the Creator for the 
universe.19 According to Aquinas, the first and foremost principle of law is that ‘good is to be 
done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. All other precepts are based on this’.20 Whatever 
practical reason apprehends something to be ‘good’, this belongs to the precept that 
something must be done or at least to not be avoided.21 The opposite shall be true so that, in 
their essentials, the precepts of natural law are unchangeable.22 The validity of human law is 
therefore dependent on the levels of justice determined by the universal principle that ‘which 
is not just seems to be no law at all’. Because ‘the force of a law depends on the extent of its 
justice … [i]n human affairs’, Aquinas stated, 
 
… a thing is said to be just, from being right, according to the rule of reason. But the 
first rule of reason is the law of nature … Consequently, every human law has just so 
                                                          
Vol. II (Hansebooks, 2016), 111 and 114; see also: William L. Newman, Politics of Aristotle, Vol. III 
(Hansebooks, 2016), 130, 132, and 208.   
14 Edwin W. Patterson, Jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of the Law (Brooklyn/NY, The Foundation Press, 1953), 
338–39. 
15 J. H. Abraham, Origins and Growth of Sociology (London/UK: Penguin, 1973), 25. 
16 Aristotle, Politics, I.2, 125B15-16, 27-30, 125a15-18. 
17 Aroney, “Subsidiarity in the Writings of Aristotle and Aquinas”, 9. 
18 Ibid., 9. 
19 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, II, Q 93, art 3. 
20 Patterson, Jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of the Law, 348. 
21 Charles E. Rice, 50 Questions on the Natural Law in a Post-Christian Age (San Francisco/CA: Ignatius Press, 
1999), 52. 
22 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 72, I, II, Q 94, art 5. 
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much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it 
deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of the law.23 
 
Aquinas is said to promote a synthesis of Aristotelian thought. This leads him to a theology 
of social development based on an account of the ‘smaller associations’, with each of these 
associations pursuing legitimate and self-sufficient ends. Aquinas sees the ‘smaller 
associations’ having their own proper degree of separateness and independence from one 
another. He also sees a considerable degree of integration and interdependence of such 
associations with the larger communities, particularly the state. There is an undeniable 
appreciation of intermediary groups and its grades and jurisdictions. Some of them are 
organised into their own graded hierarchies. These associations, from the smallest to the 
largest, must be allowed by the state to make unique and special contributions as a means to 
achieve human fulfilment. According to Aroney, ‘[t]his idea of a plurality of communities of 
a political, ecclesiastical, social and economic nature, themselves composed of smaller 
constituent communities, readily suggested the idea of an elective, corporate representation of 
the smaller community in the governing institutions of the larger.’24  By proclaiming the 
supremacy of natural law over positive laws, some elements in Aquinas’s theory points to a 
classical liberal concept of limited government. As Professor Aroney points out, Aquinas 
favoured constitutional monarchical rule over authoritarian government:  
 
He was acutely conscious of the propensity of kings to fall into tyranny, and he 
suggested several ways in which the authority of the king ought to be tempered, 
including the formation of compacts (pacta) which place constitutional limits on his 
power, mechanisms by which a tyrannical king can be deposed and systems of ‘mixed 
government’ which enable all to have a ‘share’ in ruling’.25  
 
Based on this view, it would be contrary to the character of good governance for the civil 
authority ‘to impede people from acting according to their responsibilities – except in 
emergencies’. 26 Aquinas reminds us that one of the hallmarks of political tyranny to 
completely undermine all forms of solidarity among the people, thus preventing them from 
joining in the various compacts and associations whereby the ties of friendship and trust can 
be established.27 Therefore, as Aquinas put it, ‘once the king is established, the government 
of the kingdom must be so arranged that opportunity to tyrannize be removed. At the same 
time his power should be so tempered that he cannot easily fall into tyranny’.28 For Aquinas, 
‘man is bound to obey secular princes in so far as this is required by the order of justice. 
Wherefore if the prince’s authority is not just but usurped, or if he commands what is unjust, 
his subjects are not bound to obey him, except perhaps accidentally in order to avoid scandal 
or danger’.29 Ultimately, Aquinas stated: 
If it is a people’s right to provide itself with a king, and if that king tyrannically abuses 
the royal power, there is no injustice if the community deposes or checks him whom 
they have raised to the kingship, nor can it be charged with a breach of faith for 
abandoning a tyrant, even if the people had previously bound themselves to him in 
perpetuity; because, by not faithfully conducting himself in government as the royal 
                                                          
23 Ibid., Q 95. 
24 Aroney, “Subsidiarity in the Writings of Aristotle and Aquinas”, 22. 
25 Thomas Aquinas, De Regimine Principium I.7.1-12 [41-52]; Summa Theologica, I-II, 95.4 and 105.1  
26 Aroney, “Subsidiarity in the Writings of Aristotle and Aquinas”, 25. 
27 Ibid., 23. 
28 Aquinas, De Regimine Principum , Bk I, Ch 2. 
29 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II, II, Q 104, art 6. 
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office demands, he has brought it on himself if his subjects renounce their bargain with 
him.30 
Above all, the principles of good governance supported by Aquinas are: the supremacy of 
legislature over the judiciary; the independence of the judiciary from any form of political 
pressure; and the reliance of judges on fixed rules and principles. These, according to him, 
are institutional arrangements aiming at the protection of natural rights.31 Above all, wrote 
the American Catholic jurist, Charles Rice, ‘Aquinas’ analysis is a prescription for limited 
government, providing a rational basis on which to affirm that there are limits to what the 
state can rightly do. His insistence that the power of the human law be limited implies a 
[natural] right of the person not to be subjected to an unjust law’.32 In this political-
philosophical perspective, Russell Kirk commented:  
 
natural laws and natural rights and duties all are part of a divine plan for human destiny. 
They are the laws and rights and duties that arise from the enduring nature that God has 
given to human beings. The Christian believes that human nature does not change: the 
character of man in this world always will be what is now, to the end of tie – a mixture 
of good and evil. Therefore these natural rights and duties always will endure. It is 
better for a man to die than to surrender his natural rights to ignore his natural duties. 
And this Christian concept of right and duties lie at the foundation of American society 
and government.33   
 
IV. Subsidiarity and the Common Good  
 
In Catholic doctrine social justice is the demand that the common good be realised through 
societies, institutions, and groups. This social doctrine, wrote Pope John Paul II, ‘belongs to 
the field, not of ideology, but of theology and particularly of moral theology’.34 In this 
context, ‘subsidiarity is a principle derivative of social justice, according to which each 
member of society is capacitated to perform its social role for the common good’.35 Above 
all, this is a principle of non-absorption of lower societies by higher societies, and above all 
by the state. Instead, subsidiarity demands that when aid is given to individuals or societies, it 
be for the purpose of encouraging and strengthening them. 
When naming subsidiarity in Quadragesimo, Pius described it as a ‘most weighty’ 
(gravissimum) principle of Catholic social doctrine. The Pope also declared it to be a ‘fixed’ 
(fixum) and ‘unshakable’ (immotumque) principle of the Church.  As noted by Patrick 
McKinley Brennan, the Catholic Church regards subsidiarity ‘not as a “policy” or a mere 
political preference, but instead as one among the unchangeable ontological principles of the 
socio-political order’.36 According to this eminent Catholic legal philosopher, subsidiarity 
enjoys both positive and negative aspects:  
 
Negatively, it is a principle of non-absorption of lower societies by higher societies, 
above all by the state. This is the aspect of subsidiarity that is commonly invoked today, 
                                                          
30 Aquinas, De Regimine Principum, Bk 1, Ch 6. 
31 Patterson, Jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of the Law, 350. 
32 Charles E. Rice, 50 Questions on the Natural Law: What It Is and Whey We Need It (San Francisco/CA: Ignatius 
Press, 1999), 85. 
33 Russell Kirk, The American Cause (Wilmington/DE: ISI Books, 2014), 27. 
34 Pope John Paul II, Encyclical letter Solicitudo rei socialis (1987) [41] - emphasis original.  
35 Patrick McKinley Brennan, “Subsidiarity in the Tradition of Catholic Social Doctrine”, in Global Perspectives 
on Subsidiarity, Michelle Evans and Augusto Zimmermann (eds.) (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 37.  
36 Ibid. 31.  
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but it represents only half the story. Positively, subsidiarity is also the principle that 
when aid is given to a particular society, including by the state, it be for the purpose of 
encouraging and strengthening that society. 37 
 
The way subsidiarity functions implies that the goal of achieving the common good does not 
confer the state any right or authority over what the human person or the communities 
(family, church, schools, etc.) can do by their own power. The idea creates no right for the 
state beyond its proper limits, emphasising that subsidiarity ‘is inherent in the nature of the 
common good’.38 Basically, wrote the celebrated Austrian theologian and social theorist, 
Johannes Messner (1891-1984),  
 
the common good principle and the subsidiarity principle are one … The common good 
confers powers and at the same time limits them: it empowers them to do everything 
necessary for its actual realization, but only that. The common good principle and the 
principle of subsidiarity function are two sides of one and the same thing. Thus it was 
that Pius XI, when he coined the term “subsidiarity function” called it the “fundamental 
principle of social philosophy” … while Leo XIII described the common good principle 
as “after God, the first and last law in society.39    
 
More recently, in Centesimus Annus (1991) John Paul II stated that human nature ‘is not 
completely fulfilled in the State, but is realised in various intermediary groups, beginning 
with the family, including economic, social, political and cultural groups which stem from 
human nature itself and have their own autonomy’.40 Subsidiarity means help or assistance, 
meaning that higher orders can intervene in the affairs of lower orders insofar as such an 
intervention generates ‘auxiliary aids’ and never ‘permanent substitutes’. John Paul II goes 
on to remind that the ‘malfunctions and defects’ of the so-called ‘Welfare State’ are the direct 
result of an ‘inadequate understanding of the tasks proper to the state’.41 And it is precisely 
for this reason, wrote John Paul II,  
 
[that] the principle of subsidiarity must be respect[ed] [so that] a community of a 
higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower 
order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of 
need and help to coordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society, 
always with a view to the common good. … In fact, it would appear that needs are 
best understood and satisfied by people who are closest to them and who act as 
neighbours to those in need.42   
In keeping with the spirit of the ethnological roots of the word, subsidiarity opposes 
centralising, bureaucratising forms of mass welfare assistance by the state, which deprive 
citizens of personal responsibility toward themselves, their families, and their societies.  
Subsidiarity thus recognises that the best way to achieve the common good is through the 
spontaneous interactions between free and responsible citizens. Subsidiarity, therefore, is a 
bulwark of limited government, advocating that ‘intermediate social entities can properly 
perform the functions that fall to them without being required to hand them over unjustly to 
                                                          
37 Ibid. 35.  
38 Johannes Messner, Social Ethics in the Natural Law Tradition (St Louis/MO: Herder Books Co. 1965), 210.  
39 Ibid., 214.  
40 Pope John Paul II, Encyclical letter Centesimus Annus (1991) [13]. 
41 Ibid [48].  
42 Ibid.  
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other social entities of a higher level, by which they would end up being absorbed and 
substituted, in the end seeing themselves denied their dignity and essential place’.43 
 
V. Solidarity, Subsidiarity, and the Common Good  
 
The functions of morally upright associations exemplify the right of dominion and command 
within their respective spheres of autonomy. As Pius XI stated, subsidiarity functions as a 
concrete principle, not merely a formal principle.  It has content, not just form: it ‘declares a 
quite definite distribution of competencies based on the order of being and of ends.’44 
According to Brennan, ‘although subsidiarity does not create a social ontology, it discerns 
and announces the one ordained by the common good. … It is these genuine authorities, of 
course, that Leviathan in all of its successive instantiations wished to vaporize, and the 
principle of subsidiary function responds by observing that the vigor and vitality of such 
authorities are required by the common good’.45 Thus Brennan also reminds us that the value 
of subsidiarity protects the intrinsic, and not merely instrumental, value of associating.  
Catholic social doctrine frequently refers to this as ‘solidarity’:   
 
Solidarity highlights in a particular way the intrinsic social nature of the human 
person. …  Solidarity must be seen above all in its value as a moral virtue that 
determines the order of institutions. … Solidarity is also an authentic moral virtue 
… a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good. 
…  Solidarity rises to the rank of fundamental social virtue since it places itself in 
the sphere of justice.  It is a virtue directed par excellence to the common good.46 
 
Like the ‘lesser’ communities from which they are built, ‘greater’ communities are also 
defined by the ‘bonds of interdependence’ – or duties – that arise from the human 
relationships that create them47. Thus, as stated by Pius XI in Quadragesimo Anno (1931), 
while ‘the principle [of subsidiarity] operates within a graduated order in which the larger and 
higher is superior in authority, and the state is supreme among all’, the measure of duty at 
each level is defined by the ‘bonds of interdependence’ that defines its character as a 
community:  ‘For every social activity ought of its very nature to furnish help [subsidium] to 
the members of the body social ….’48. Robert Cover’s masterful exploration of the Halakhic 
(Jewish law) concept of mitzvah49 is especially illuminating here:  
When I am asked to reflect upon Judaism and human rights … the first thought 
that comes to mind is that the categories are wrong. I do not mean, of course, that 
basic ideas of human dignity and worth are not powerfully expressed in the Jewish 
legal and literary traditions. Rather, I mean that because it is a legal tradition 
Judaism has its own categories for expressing through law the worth and dignity of 
                                                          
43 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (London/UK: Burns 
& Oates, 2005), 94.  
44 Messner, Social Ethics in the Natural Law Tradition, 210 
45 Brennan, “Subsidiarity in the Tradition of Catholic Social Doctrine”, 40. 
46  Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, 98-9 (emphasis 
and internal quotations omitted). 
47 Ibid., 98.  
48 Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno: Encyclical Letter on Reconstruction of Social Order (May 15, 1931) [79] 
(emphasis added).   
49 There are three types of mitzvoth: 1) mitzvot d'oraita (Aramaic: "from the Torah"); 2) ormitzvot d'rabbanan 
(Aramaic for "from the rabbis"); and 3) a mitzvah that arises from custom (a minhag). In common parlance, the 
term “mitzvah” can also refer to any good deed. See Halakha (ֲההָכָל) in Judaism 101 at 
http://www.jewfaq.org/halakhah.htm (last accessed December 14, 2018). 
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each human being. And the categories are not closely analogous to “human rights.” 
The principal word in Jewish law, which occupies a place equivalent in evocative 
force to the American legal system’s “rights”, is the word “mitzvah” which 
literally means commandment but has a general meaning closer to “incumbent 
obligation.50 
 
Due to these ‘bounds of interdependence’ among all human beings, the foundation of ‘lesser’ 
communities – families, tribes, unions, towns, cities, churches, etc. – are the crucibles in 
which the moral norms of the nations that coalesce around them are elaborated and refined.  
Because these moral norms organize the behavior of individuals and associations within these 
foundation communities, they must be viewed as an integral aspect of the original rights of 
self-governance with which any robust concept of subsidiarity – or of human rights – must be 
concerned. Recounting at length the ways in which the modern, central state has moved 
relentlessly to supplant the types of private charity that flourish in local communities with a 
state-controlled, welfare bureaucracy that grows at the expense of a dynamic exchange 
economy, Rev Robert Sirico explains that ‘the largest danger of all’ is the moral hazard 
associated with increasing dependence on the state.51   
The incumbent obligations arising from these bonds of interdependence define the 
nature and character of these communities.  From the most fundamental and personal of these 
bonds, we deduce the incumbent obligations of spouses, parents, children, and extended 
families. As we broaden the scope of social relationships from family to tribe; to 
neighborhood; to guild and voluntary association; to city, state, province, and nation-state, we 
can see quite clearly why, as Jonathan Chaplin explains, ‘the exercise of a subsidiary function 
is itself an act of solidarity’.52 According to Brennan,  
 
Solidarity is never just one thing, but rather the varied ensemble of firm 
dispositions that serve the common good by a unity of action for the ends of 
particular, upright societies. The meaning of subsidiarity, and solidarity, in 
Catholic social doctrine turns on what we mean by society. Subsidiarity require 
that the sociality of human beings be preserved and harmonized, and no 
argument to benefits external to a particular society itself will prevail, unless 
there be moral reason to dissolve the society.53   
 
It follows that unless we have a clear understanding of the ‘incumbent obligations’ assigned 
to each of the more broadly-based (‘greater’) communities, it will be impossible to elaborate, 
much less to operationalize, the fuller conception of subsidiarity:  ‘[A] community of a higher 
order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the 
latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need and help to coordinate its 
activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the common good’.54  
And yet, as Yves Simon points out, ‘[m]ere partnership does not do anything to put an end to 
the solitude of the partners,’55 but in a true society, by contrast, ‘corporate unity is one of the 
                                                          
50 Robert M. Cover, “Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order”, Journal of Law & Religion 5 
(1987): 65. 
51 Rev Robert A. Sirico, “Subsidiarity and the Reform of the Welfare of the Nation State”, in Global Perspectives 
on Subsidiarity, eds. Michelle Evans and Augusto Zimmermann (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 120 
52 Jonathan Chaplin, “Subsidiarity and Social Pluralism”, in Global Perspectives on Subsidiarity, eds. Michelle 
Evans and Augusto Zimmermann (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 75. 
53 Brennan, “Subsidiarity in the Tradition of Catholic Social Doctrine”, 42. 
54 Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus (1991) [48]. 
55  Yves R. Simon, Philosophy of Democratic Government (South Bend/IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1993), 64 
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reasons for action.  Someone leaving a partnership can export his share; the common good of 
a society, however, cannot be divided, only shared and participated’.  In sum, societies are the 
perfecting opportunities for naturally social beings to cause good in others, including through 
the supernatural assistance of grace.  
 
VI. Subsidiary Role of the State  
 
Christians cannot discuss the proper role of the state without first acknowledging that every 
properly governing order is a divinely ordained structure with multiple tiers of governance 
that God established for the benefit of humanity. The reason for such a plurality is simply that 
God wishes everyone to be free.56 Since such a plurality provides checks and balances against 
the abuse of governmental power,57 tyranny occurs whenever the state goes outside its proper 
sphere by ignoring what can be done by the lesser circles of power. Emblematic of such an 
approach is the articulation of a political theory whereby societies are allowed to progress 
naturally from families through to villages, and, finally, to the state.  
The apprehension is that the state is not the only ‘community’; there are also the 
family, the church, and numerous other social orders and fraternities.58 This plurality consists 
of different spheres of government, each of them having its own limits of responsibility and 
jurisdiction. When applied in the context of a federal system, for example, ‘subsidiarity 
provides that functions should, where practical, be vested in the lowest level of government 
to ensure that their exercise is as close to the people as possible and reflects community 
preferences and local conditions’.59 In other words, one should leave to the federal 
government only what the local government cannot do in a better or similar way.  
Of course, subsidiarity is not a blanket call to strengthen the local power. There might 
be things that only the central government can do. However, every government has only 
limited responsibilities and we should expect it to accomplish only limited tasks. Besides, as 
we know so very well from history, power tends to corrupt and, as Lord Acton famously 
stated, ‘[p]ower tends to corrupt, and absolutely power corrupts absolutely’.60 Thus a 
government that disperses power is better than one that gathers power into the hands of just a 
few. Accordingly, subsidiarity is focused on the auxiliary role of government, implying that 
the orders with greatest proximity to the citizen should be prioritized. Implicit in the idea is 
the assumption that the local power can perform its activities and services just as efficiently 
as a more distant tier of government, if not more so. As noted by law professor Anne 
Twomey,  
 
                                                          
56 There is a profound different between authentic freedom and license to do whatever one pleases. When life is 
subject to no personal restraint, freedom becomes a mere licence to do as one pleases. Ultimately, freedom 
conceived as a mere license leads to anarchy, and anarchy manifests itself in political tyranny. See: John H 
Hallowell, The Moral Foundations of Democracy (Indianapolis/IN: Liberty Fund, 2007), 102. Such a distinction 
was acknowledged by John Locke. In Lockean terminology, by ‘liberty’ one means those personal freedoms that 
every individual ought to possess in accordance with objective and universal principles of the natural law. 
‘License’, by contrast, Locke refers to the “freedoms” or licences that people actually ought to not possess 
because they are anti-social or licentious – such behaviours must be lawfully constrained by every legitimate 
government. See: Randy E Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and The Rule of Law (New York/NY: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 2. 
57 Geoffrey de Q Walker, Ten Advantages of a Federal Constitution (Sydney/NSW: Centre for Independent 
Studies, 2001) 37.  
58 Aroney, “Subsidiarity in the Writings of Aristotle and Aquinas”, p 13. 
59 Anne Twomey, “Reforming Australia’s Federal System” Federal Law Review 36 (2008): 59. 
60 Lord Acton (John Emerich Edward Dalberg), “Letter to Archbishop Mandell Creighton” April 5, 1887, 
https://history.hanover.edu/courses/excerpts/165acton.html  
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subsidiarity provides that functions should, where practical, be vested in the 
lowest level of government to ensure that their exercise is as close to the people 
as possible and reflects community preferences and local conditions … The 
principle of subsidiarity places the onus on those who seek to place a function 
with a higher level of government to make the case for it.61 
VII. Government Responsibilities 
 
Catholic social teaching sees social justice as a primary reason for the existence of civil 
government. Justice has been traditionally defined as rendering to each one what is due 
according to a right standard. This definition has been epitomised in the Latin motto suum 
cuique, which was popularised by Cicero (106-143 BC) in De Nature Deorum (“iustitita 
suum cuique distribut” – justice renders to everyone his due) and later codified in the Corpus 
Juris Civilis – a collection of fundamental works in jurisprudence, issued from 529 to 534 by 
order of Justinian I, Eastern Roman Emperor. Cicero believed that real justice transcends 
human expediency because it derives from ‘the same Law, eternal and unchangeable’ enacted 
by God, who is ‘its designer, expounder and enactor’ and ‘the universal ruler and governor of 
all things’.62 Accordingly, the right standard for justice is found to be derived from principles 
of the natural law, which is based on the character of a just and benevolent Creator. This 
basic standard insists, among other things, that the innocent shall be protected from 
evildoers—rapists, murderers, child molesters, thieves, sex traffickers, dishonest tax 
collectors, adulterers, etc. In this context, Cicero famously declared:  
The most foolish notion of all is the belief that everything is just which is found 
in the customs or laws of nations. Would that be true, even if those laws had been 
enacted by tyrants? … [or if a law is imposed] that a dictator might put to death 
with impunity any citizen he wished, even without a trial. For Justice is one; it 
binds all human society, and is based on one Law, which is right reason applied 
to command and prohibition … If the principles of justice were found on the 
decrees of people, the edicts of principles, or the decisions of judges, then justice 
would sanction robbery and adultery and forgery of wills, in case these acts were 
approved by the votes or decrees of the populace.63 
 
The state, as such, has only a limited power. Its ultimate mandate is to preserve the freedom 
of the lower social orders (the family, church, etc.) to more properly exercise their roles. Of 
course, trusting too much in what the state can do may result in abuse of power.  The moral 
costs of statism, or excessive governmental intervention, are perhaps in no other field more 
visible than in the field of family policy. Although the family serves as a primary means of 
acculturation and transmission of values from generation to generation, family ties in today’s 
societies are so weak that fewer people think they ought to help their family members. As a 
result, people in distress no longer expect to obtain much help this way.64 Rather than 
addressing these problems, public policy seems to have further destabilised the family with 
disastrous consequences.65  
                                                          
61 Ibid., 59. 
62 Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Legibus, 1.6.18-19. Quoted from Augusto Zimmermann, Western Legal Theory: 
History, Concepts and Perspectives (Chatswood/NSW: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2013), 7.  
63 Ibid, I.15.42 and I.16.43–4. 
64 H.B. Acton, The Morals of Markets and Related Essays (Indianapolis/IN: Liberty Fund, 1993), 81–2. 
65 Sirico, “Subsidiarity and the Reform of the Welfare of the Nation State”, p 116.  
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The last few decades have seen the dramatic proliferation of laws allowing the 
unilateral dissolution of the marriage contract. By making divorce easily available and purely 
personal, the state has ultimately transformed marriage into a legal absurdity that denies the 
doctrine of accountability and holds no inducements to personal misconduct. Since we are all 
sinners by nature, these inducements inevitably provide a strong temptation for selfish and 
unethical behaviour. Whenever and wherever the family breaks down, of course, the state 
must step in as a substitute for the dysfunctional family. Hence the gradual increase of the 
state’s jurisdiction over the family and its individual members.66  
In Australia, the divorce rates started to climb from the mid-1960s and rose very 
sharply following the introduction of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) that introduced “no-
fault” dirvorde. There are tremendous social costs all around when marriages break up. First, 
divorce increases economic vulnerability of adults and children, reducing many of them to 
poverty and deprivation.67 As noted by Dr Matthew Bambling, a relationship expert and 
senior lecturer in medicine at the University of Queensland, although divorce is a primary 
source of poverty in Australia, easily available divorce also means that ‘people may be 
required to rely in greater part on the social welfare system, [and] there is the potential for 
court costs borne through the government-funded system’.68 These family breakdowns 
presently cost the Australian economy more than $14 billion a year, with each Australian 
taxpayer paying about $1,100 a year to support families in crisis.69 Above all, writes law 
professor Patrick Parkinson, ‘fragile families lead to broken hearts. They also threaten the 
wellbeing of the community as a whole. Turning this around will require a herculean effort, 
but we cannot afford not to make the attempt’.70 
By allowing the marriage contract to be easily breached without proper legal 
consequences, the state undermined the value we traditionally place on marriage to the 
detriment of society as a whole. And yet, it is relevant also to consider how the philosophy of 
state interventionism appears to create a profound distortion of the natural order of liberty, 
which ultimately affects both private initiative and individual responsibility. This is one of 
the reasons as to why the Catechism of the Catholic Church explicitly determines that 
‘respect for subsidiarity’ must set ‘the limits for state intervention.’ 71 Ultimately, wrote John 
Paul II in Centesimus Annus (1991), ‘the malfunctions and defects in the Social Assistance 
State are the result of an inadequate understanding of the tasks proper to the State.’72 This 
understanding was reinforced by Benedict XVI in his first papal encyclical, Deus Caritas Est 
(2005): 
 
                                                          
66 See: Christopher Brohier and Augusto Zimmermann, “Avoiding Unnecessary Divorce and Restoring Justice 
in Marital Separation”, The Western Australian Jurist 6 (2015): 173-194.  
67 See, for example, P J Smock, W D Manning and S Gupta, “The Effect of Marriage and Divorce on Women’s 
Economic Well-Being”, American Sociological Review 64, no.6, (1999):  794. See also: R Finie, “Women, Men 
and the Economic Consequences of Divorce: Evidence from Canadian Longitudinal Data”, Canadian Review of 
Sociology and Anthropology 30, no.2 (1993): 205; T A Mauldin, “Women Who Remain Above the Poverty Level 
in Divorce: Implications for Family Policy” Family Relations 39, no.2 (1990), 141. 
68 Lauren Wilson and Lisa Cornish, ‘Divorce is Costing the Australian Economy $14 Billion a Year’, The 
Australian, July 6, 2014, at <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/divorce-is-costing-the-australian-economy-
14-billion-a-year/story-e6frg6n6-1226979027353?nk=1db67301adc56c5b7c22cb13b14ae7a5>. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Patrick Parkinson, ‘Another Inconvenient Truth: Fragile Families and the Looming Financial Crisis for the 
Welfare State’, Sydney Law School Legal Studies, Research Paper Number 12, 5 February 2012, 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1992740> .  
71 See: Peter Widulski, “Bakke, Grutter, and the Principle of Subsidiarity”, Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 
32 (2005): 855. 
72 Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus (1991) [48].  
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There is no ordering of the State so just that it can eliminate the need for a service 
of love. Whoever wants to eliminate love is preparing to eliminate man as such. 
There will always be suffering which cries out for consolation and help. There 
will always be loneliness. There will always be situations of material need where 
help in the form of concrete love of neighbor is indispensable. The State which 
would provide everything, absorbing everything into itself, would ultimately 
become a mere bureaucracy incapable of guaranteeing the very thing which the 
suffering person – every person – needs: namely, loving personal concern.73  
 
The state is made not only of people but of societies formed by them. This plurality of orders 
consist of different realms of governance, each having its proper limits of responsibility and 
jurisdiction. The first form of government is personal self-government, which is based on the 
autonomy of people guided by the natural law of liberty. The family is the next instance of 
government naturally instituted by God. The family is the first government in the life of the 
child. Finally, there is the state as a political society ordained by God to maintain a right and 
just environment where freedom and justice can flourish. In this context, St Paul wrote in his 
Epistle to the Romans that the civil authority must be a cause of fear not to those who do 
good, but rather to those who practice evil: ‘For government is God's servant working for 
your good. But if you do what is wrong, you should be afraid. The government does not bear 
the sword for no reason. It is God's servant, an avenger to execute God's anger on anyone 
who does what is wrong.’ (Romans 13:4)  
The Catholic Church sees government as an institution established by God (Genesis 
9:6; Romans 13).  God ordained the state to practice justice. As long as government serves 
the ultimate purpose for which it was established, St Peter instructs: ‘Submit you for the 
Lord’s sake to every authority instituted among men, whether to the king, as the supreme 
authority, or to governors, who are sent by him to punish those who do wrong and to 
commend those who do right’. (1 Peter 2:13–14). Accordingly, subsidiarity is about 
establishing the limits for state action, with all the most recent Popes manifesting their clear 
opposition to excessive governmental intervention. Benedict XVI, for example, was deeply 
concerned about the moral consequences of an all-powerful state ‘which regulates and 
controls everything’. Subsidiarity, Benedict stated,  
 
insofar as it encourages men and women to enter freely into life-giving relationships 
with those to whom they are most closely connected and upon whom they most 
immediately depend, and demands of higher authorities respect for these relationships – 
manifests a "vertical" dimension pointing towards the Creator of the social order 
(cf. Rom 12:16, 18). A society that honours the principle of subsidiarity liberates people 
from a sense of despondency and hopelessness, granting them the freedom to engage 
with one another in the spheres of commerce, politics and culture (cf. Quadragesimo 
Anno, 80). When those responsible for the public good attune themselves to the natural 
human desire for self-governance based on subsidiarity, they leave space for individual 
responsibility and initiative, but most importantly, they leave space 
for love (cf. Rom 13:8; Deus Caritas Est, 28), which always remains "the most 
excellent way" (cf. 1 Cor 12:31). 74   
 
                                                          
73 Pope Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est (2005) [28(b)]. 
74 Pope Benedict XVI, “Address of His Holiness Benedict XVI to the Participants in the 14th Session of the 
Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences”, Consistory Hall, Vatican State, May 3, 2008,  
http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2008/may/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20080503_social-
sciences.html 
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By constantly interfering in the autonomy of peoples and societies, the state lacks the 
capacity to fulfil their most essential functions properly. It will soon be sapped of its own 
strength or, alternatively, become totalitarian as it succumbs to the temptation to intervene 
not to restore the socio-political order, but to colonise it.75 Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), 
arguably the most influential Thomist of the twentieth-century, once observed that the state is 
made up not only of people, ‘but particular societies formed by them, and a pluralist body 
politic would allow to these societies the greatest autonomy possible and would diversify its 
own internal structure in what is typically required by their nature’.76 In this context, the 
principle of subsidiarity falsifies the proposition so disastrously implemented by the French 
revolutionaries of 1789: ‘It is of necessity that no partial society should exist in the state’. 77 
On the contrary, ‘societies are the perfecting opportunities for naturally social beings to cause 
good in others, including through the supernatural assistance of grace’.78 As stressed by 
Benedict XVI in Deus Caritas Est (2005):  
 
We do not need a State which regulates and controls everything, but a State which, in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, generously acknowledges and supports 
initiatives arising from the different social forces and combines spontaneity with 
closeness to those in need. The Church is one of those living forces: she is alive with 
the love enkindled by the Spirit of Christ. This love do not simply offer people material 
help, but refreshment and care for their souls, something which often is even more 
necessary than material support.79 
 
Statism can offer no promise of salvation, except through the hope that a powerful state will 
perfect both the social environment and us. Statism appear therefore to assume that ultimate 
salvation can only be achieved collectively. Such a utopian belief in humanity’s perfectibility, 
and the perfectibility of the social environment, is based on a profound misconception of 
human nature. By contrast, Catholic social theory emphasizes that every person is worthy of 
inalienable rights and responsibilities. This is a theme to which Benedict XVI returned time 
and again as he addressed a world that ever threatened the lonely individual against the all-
powerful state.  
 
VIII. Consequences of Excessive State Intervention 
 
Subsidiarity must be understood as a principle of authentic help or assistance. Since it means 
help or assistance, subsidiarity sets the proper limits for state action, implying that higher 
orders can intervene in the affairs of lower orders only as auxiliary aids and never as 
permanent substitutes. Subsidiarity indicates that state intervention in the internal decision-
making of private associations is legitimate only insofar as it is designed to protect the rights 
that the members of the association have given themselves to participate in its self-
governance. Because communities are natural outgrowths of human activity, they, like the 
individuals who form them, possess, by ‘nature’, original rights of self-governance. That 
being so, subsidiarity as a principle cannot be unduly limited by a spatial metaphor or a 
general norm of decentralization.  Rather, as noted by Chaplin, it should be understood as a 
                                                          
75 Brennan, “Subsidiarity in the Tradition of Catholic Social Doctrine”, 40. 
76 Jacques Maritain, ‘Integral Humanism’ (1935) in O. Bird (ed.), Integral Humanism, Freedom in the Modern 
World, and a Letter of Independence – The Collected Works of Jacques Maritain, - Vol.11, (South Bend/IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), p 256. 
77 Brennan, “Subsidiarity in the Tradition of Catholic Social Doctrine”, 43. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Pope Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est (2005) [28(b)]. 
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natural outgrowth of the social and cultural pluralism that arises when ‘lesser communities 
originate from the inclinations of human nature’.80   
This is about identifying the moral (and practical) functions to be exercised by the 
lower orders, which are essential to the well-functioning of a free society of responsible 
individuals.  Unfortunately, however, many people are inclined today to look on government 
aid as a ‘right’ and thus to regard themselves as entitled to every form of state assistance. 
This prevents them from contemplating their own self-worth and, accordingly, from making 
attempts to preserve their own self-respect. After describing the moral implications of the 
‘modern central state’, Fr Robert Sirico commented:  
 
The welfare state pursues its tasks in terms of a moral code increasingly alien from 
traditional Christian tenets. For example, the very concept of a welfare ‘entitlement’ 
runs contrary to the scriptural understanding of aiding the poor: helping others is a 
moral duty that springs from spiritual commitment and is not essentially exercised 
through coercion or government mandates. The modern, central state has proven itself 
incapable of distinguishing between the deserving and the underserving poor, and 
between aid that fosters independence and moral development from that which 
reinforces a dependency mindset and moral nihilism. 81 
 
The principle of subsidiarity postulates that is it is not just an administrative inconvenience, 
but a ‘grave evil’, to deny people the dignity and authority given to them directly by God. 
Although government aid can do some good for those who might need a temporary boost, to 
get back on their feet (effectively a Band-Aid for a broken bone), such an assistance should 
not eliminate the more pressing moral (and spiritual) needs that lie at the heart of every 
dysfunctional behaviour. Sometimes what the recipient of government aid needs is actually a 
strong message of work and sobriety. To a great extent, writes Dr Nancy R. Pearcey,  
 
Government aid can actually make things worse. By handing out welfare checks 
impersonally to all who qualify, without addressing the underlying behavioural 
problems, the government in essence ‘rewards’ antisocial and dysfunctional patterns. 
And any behaviour the government rewards will generally tend to increase. As one 
perceptive nineteenth century critic noted, government assistance is a ‘might solvent 
to sunder the ties of kinship, to quench the affections of family, to suppress in the 
poor themselves the instinct of self-reliance and self-respect – to convert them into 
paupers.82 
 
Ultimately, Catholic social doctrine teaches very clearly that the malfunctions and defects in 
the Welfare State are the result of an inadequate understanding of the tasks proper to the 
state. In Centesimus Annus (1991) one finds the important reminder that human nature ‘is not 
completely fulfilled in the State, but is realised in various intermediary groups, beginning 
with the family, including economic, social, political and cultural groups which stem from 
human nature itself and have their own autonomy’.83 The encyclical goes on to observe that 
the ‘malfunctions and defects’ of the Welfare State are the direct result of an ‘inadequate 
                                                          
80 Chaplin, “Subsidiarity and Social Pluralism”, 71. 
81 Sirico, “Subsidiarity and the Reform of the Welfare of the Nation State”, 123. 
82 Nancy R. Pearcey, Total Truth: Liberating Christianity from its Cultural Captivity (Wheaton/IL: Crossway, 
2004) p 61.  
83 Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus (1991) [13]. 
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understanding of the tasks proper to the state.’84 In that encyclical letter, John Paul II 
concluded: 
 
[T]he principle of subsidiarity must be respect[ed] [so that] a community of a higher 
order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving 
the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need and help to 
coordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the 
common good. … In fact, it would appear that needs are best understood and satisfied 
by people who are closest to them and who act as neighbours to those in need.85   
 
But consider however how excessive state intervention stymies people’s ability to provide 
financial assistance. When assets are taken from them via excessive levels of taxation, it 
leaves very little to donate to private charity. Inseparable from ‘any form of all-encompassing 
welfare state’ is a regime of high taxation welfare that diminishes the sphere of free services 
by which people can engage in spontaneous activities, thus corroding the culture of civility 
that sustains a truly compassionate society. The inevitable result is that an ‘all-encompassing 
state’ acquires greater financial power to invest solely in the activities that only the small elite 
who controls the state machinery deem worthy to support. According to John Gray:  
 
If, because of the confiscation of higher incomes, there are important social and 
cultural activities that can no longer be sustained privately, such as provision for 
high culture and the arts, then once again the state assumes responsibility for such 
activities through a program of subsidy. Inevitably, the state comes to exercise 
ever-increasing degree of control over them. The consequence of redistributionist 
policy, accordingly, is the curtailment of private initiative in many spheres of 
social life, the destruction of the man of independent means, and the weakening 
of civil society.86  
 
In contrast to this, subsidiarity is premised on empowering the citizens with decision-making 
carried out as close to them as is viable87 or, in simpler words, at a ‘grassroots level.’88 
Subsidiarity presupposes that ‘intermediate social entities can properly perform the functions 
that fall to them without being required to hand them over unjustly to other social entities of a 
higher level, by which they would end up being absorbed and substituted, in the end seeing 
themselves denied their dignity and essential place’.89 Thus a hierarchy of social orders is 
established, consisting first of the human person as a self-governing entity endowed by God 
with inalienable rights to life and liberty. This person is then followed by the family, the local 
community, the Church, and, finally, the state. But due to its subsidiary role, however, the 
state should not allow other God-ordained institutions (family, church, etc.) the freedom to 
perform their roles properly.  
In this sense, socialism provides a prime example of the willingness to deny the 
ultimate sovereignty of God, and place absolute sovereignty in the hands of a few. Socialism 
offers no salvation except through the hope that an all-powerful state can perfect us and our 
                                                          
84 Ibid [48].  
85 Ibid.  
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social environment. While Catholic teaching emphasizes that every person has worth and 
responsibility before God, socialism argues that salvation can only be achieved collectively 
and ultimately by means of an all-powerful state. Contrary to such a teaching, the Catholic 
doctrine stresses the value of human dignity, including personal freedom, and the limits of the 
state action.  
 
IX. The Duty to Obey Human Authority  
 
Finally, there is also the important question of obedience to human authority. The duty to 
obey authority does not require that we should stray from our ultimate responsibility towards 
God; for we are required to obey God even when our reform efforts through political 
channels fail. For example, when St Peter and St John were ordered by the Sanhedrin to stop 
preaching about Christ, they replied: ‘Judge for yourselves whether it is right in God’s sight 
to obey man rather than God’ (Acts 4:19).  Based on this historical account, Pope John XXIII 
stated in Pacem in Terris (1963):  
 
Since the right to command is required by the moral order and has its source in God, it 
follows that, if civil authorities pass laws or command anything opposed to the moral 
order and consequently contrary to the will of God, neither the laws made nor the 
authorizations granted can be binding on the consciences of the citizens, since God has 
more right to be obeyed than men.90  
 
Christ commanded his followers to be the ‘Salt and Light’ of the world. And yet, as Christ 
himself put it, salt preserves but if salt loses its saltiness it is worthless (Luke 14:34). This 
comment to be ‘salt and light’ is normally called the ‘Great Commission’, meaning that 
Christians have the moral duty to serve their fellow humans in every sphere of life, including 
law and politics.91 Think, for instance, of the great British politician, William Wilberforce 
(1759-1833). ‘God Almighty’, wrote Wilberforce, ‘has set before me two Great Objects: the 
suppression of the Slave Trade and the Reformation of Manners’.92 According to his 
biographer, Eric Metaxas: 
Wilberforce wasn’t just ‘religious’ but actually had a personal relationship with God. 
He seems to have been motivated by love—love of God and the love of his fellow 
man—more than by a simple sense of right and wrong or justice and injustice. This is 
probably the single most important factor in what he was able to do.93 
 
We can only imagine how the world would be if Christians had not fulfilled their ‘Great 
Commission’, if they had “privatised” their faith and made no impact on the life of their 
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communities. From a Christian perspective all this seems quite natural because the Bible 
commands believers to love others as they love themselves. Christians are called to love even 
their enemies and to pray for those who persecute them (Matthew 5:44). This command of 
unconditional love is ‘a critical foundation of our modern understanding of human dignity 
and human rights’.94 In Render Unto Caesar (2008) the Catholic Archbishop of Philadelphia, 
Charles J. Chaput, commented that: 
For Christians, love is a small word that relentlessly unpacks into a lot of other 
words: truth, repentance, forgiveness, mercy, charity, courage, justice. These are 
action words, all of them, including truth, because in accepting Jesus Christ, the 
Gospel says that we will know the truth, and the truth will make us free (John 
8:32)—not comfortable; not respected; but free in the real sense of the word: able 
to see and do what’s right. This freedom is meant to be used in the service of 
others. Working for justice is an obligation of Christian freedom.95 
 
In our democratic societies, we must hold human authority legally accountable via our active 
participation in government—voting, petitioning, running for political office if necessary, or 
even serving in non-elected positions where we may be able to influence those in power 
(Proverbs 29:2). The Catholic Church’s Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith succinctly 
explains this fundamental aspect of the Christian faith in the following excerpt from a 
doctrinal note:  
The social doctrine of the Church is not an intrusion into the government of individual 
countries. It is a question of the lay Catholic’s duty to be morally coherent, found 
within one’s conscience, which is one and indivisible. There cannot be two parallel 
lives in their existence; on the one hand, the so-called ‘spiritual life,’ with its values and 
demands; and on the other, the so-called ‘secular’ life, that is, life in a family, at work, 
in social responsibilities, in the responsibilities of public life and in culture. The branch, 
engrafted to the vine which is Christ, bears its fruit in every sphere of existence and 
activity. In fact, every area of the faithful’s lives, as different as they are, enters into the 
plan of God, who desires that these very areas be the ‘places in time’ where the love of 
Christ is revealed and realised for both the glory of the Father and service of others. 
Every activity, every situation, every precise responsibility—as, for example, skill and 
solidarity in work, love and dedication in the family and the education of children, 
service to society and public life and the promotion of truth in the area of culture—are 
the occasions ordained by Providence for a ‘continu[ous] exercise of faith, hope and 
Charity’ … Living and acting in conformity with one’s own conscience on questions of 
politics is not slavish acceptance of positions alien to politics or some kind of 
confessionalism, but rather the way in which Christians offer their concrete 
contribution so that, through political life, society will become more just and more 
consistent with the dignity of the human person.96 
 
X. Final Considerations  
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The Social Doctrine of the Church encourages the development of a fitting pluralistic 
democracy promoted by intermediate bodies that are capable of contributing to the attainment 
of the common good. In its legitimate authority, the state ought to be limited by a practical 
view of the common good.97 When a nation embraces subsidiarity, the state is limited both in 
its purpose and its mode of operation and, accordingly, subsidiarity will be a principle of 
governance by which the power of the state is limited enough so as to preserve the freedom 
of citizens and the lower social orders. Subsidiarity therefore recognises certain aspects of 
human life that are naturally ordained by God; that the state cannot not legitimately control. 
In this context, ‘State intervention should be characterized by genuine solidarity, which as 
such must never be separated from subsidiarity’.98 These are matters associated with 
principles that must apply to every conduct, which are matters associated with truly 
inviolable rights enjoyed by people and suitably protected by legally-enforceable constraints 
on power of various kinds.99  
In Catholic social theory, subsidiarity is premised on the affirmation that 
‘intermediate social entities can properly perform the functions that fall to them without 
being required to hand them over unjustly to other social entities of a higher level, by which 
they would end up being absorbed and substituted, in the end seeing themselves denied their 
dignity and essential place.’100 Understood in this sense, concludes the Pontifical Council for 
Justice and Peace, ‘[s]ubsidiarity … entails a corresponding series of negative implications 
that require the State to refrain from anything that would de facto restrict the existential space 
of the small essential cells of society. Their initiative, freedom and responsibility must not be 
supplanted.’101 A hierarchy of social orders is therefore established, consisting first of the 
human person as a self-governing entity and endowed by God with natural rights to life and 
liberty, followed by the family, the local community, the Church and, finally, the state. And 
since an entity of a higher order must be limited in favour of matters being resolved at the 
lowest possible level, assistance by such an order should morally elevate the recipient of aid 
and not reinforce an attitude of dependence that offers little incentive for self-responsibility 
and discipline.102  
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